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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID W. JENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a 
corporation, and JOSE F. 
GONZALES, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 16417 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages for a personal injury sus-
tained by appellant arising from a motor vehicle collision 
involving appellant and defendant Gonzales. Respondent Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company had a vehicle parked near 
the scene of the accident and was named as a co-defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(hereinafter "Mountain Bell") moved for summary judgment in this 
matter alleging its actions, whether or not negligent, were not 
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The lower court 
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, no cause of 
action. The lower court certified the Order granting summary 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
as a final judgment. Plaintiff and defendant Gonzales have 
reached a settlement in this matter and a stipulation and order 
of dismissal between them has been filed in the lower court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Mountain Bell requests that this Court affirm 
the summary judgment granted in its favor by the trial court ani 
award its costs incurred. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action for damages as a result of an injury to 
appellant. On September 8, 1977, at approximately 2:00 p.m. 
appellant was traveling north on State Road 111 on a motorcycle 
going approximately 60 mph (Gonzales Depo., p.16). At the 
intersection of State Road 171, plaintiff collided with defenda1 
Jose Gonzales who was executing a left-hand turn from Highway 
lll to head east on Highway 171 (Gonzales Depo., p .13). At this 
intersection, State Road 111 consists of five lanes, two lanes 
running north and two running south, and a middle lane for left· 
hand turns (Gonzales Depo. p.9). 
At 8:00 a.m. that morning, Mountain Bell began service worl 
on underground lines located at the intersection of State Road 
111 and State Road 171. To facilitate the needed repairs and 
for the protection of its employees, Mountain Bell parked its 
vehicle in the center of the intersection in line with the left 
turn lanes and separated and marked off the vehicle with cones 
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from all four directions. (Sciortino Depo., p.26). Additionally, 
in the north and south directions, at distances of approximately 
500 ft. and again behind the truck were "Men Working" signs 
indicating the presence of Mountain Bell employees. (Sciortino 
Depo., p.12). They were placed in conformance with standard 
Mountain Bell policies and with the Uniform Manual on Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices adopted by the Utah Department of Trans-
portation (§41-6-20, U.C.A., 1953, as amended; Sciortino Depo., 
p.71; and "Work Area Protection" pamphlet attached as Exhibit 
"A" to defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment). 1 The Mountain Bell vehicle, referred to as a 
"step van", had its 4-way flashers on, its headlights on, and 
two strobe lights flashing. (Sciortino depo., p.55) The weather 
1Appellant spends a considerable amount of time citing to a 
traffic manual that supposedly governs respondent's repair 
operations (Appellant's Brief at 6}. However, as is clear by 
reading both appellant's statements and his attached rule, they 
are inapplicable for two reasons: (1) those rules were super-
ceded by the Uniform Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices 
required by §41-6-20, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, which do not 
require Mt. Bell to provide flagmen and obtain department 
approval; and (2) Even if those provisions were in effect, they 
apply only where traffic in both directions is required to use a 
single lane of traffic. That is, flow of traffic in one direc-
tion at a time. Here, Mt. Bell's vehicle was placed in the 
center of the intersection containing five lanes of traffic. It 
was not obstructing thru traffic, but rather those vehicles 
making left-hand turns. Since traffic was not obstructed in the 
two directions and the motorists were not required to travel in 
single lanes, neither traffic flagmen nor traffic signals are 
required. Furthermore, appellant makes a bold statement to the 
effect that Mt. Bell obtained no approval from the Utah Depart-
ment of Transportation for its work in the intersection. This 
statement has no support in the record and should be totally ._ 
disregarded. 
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on that particular day was clear with high visibility and was a 
typical, early September day. (Gonzales Depo. p. 6). The loca-
tion of the vehicle's warning cones and signs are set forth in 
Exhibit "B" attached to defendant's Memorandum in Support of ite 
Motion for summary Judgment. 
Appellant complains that the defendant Jose Gonzales was 
negligent in that Jose Gonzales was (a) traveling at an excessii 
speed, (b) failed to maintain proper lookout, (c) failed to 
maintain proper control of his vehicle, (d) failed to yield tie 
right of way to the plaintiff, and ( e) made an improper left tu1 
(Plaintiff's Complaint, ~V). 
Appellant additionally alleges that Respondent Mountain Be: 
was negligent in that (a) it parked its vehicle within an inter· 
section, (b) was illegally parked, ( c) parked a vehicle in such 
manner so as ~o obstruct the view of on-coming traffic, and (d) 
failed to adequately warn (Plaintiff's Complaint ~V). 
It is not disputed that the Mountain Bell vehicle was 
stationary and that the appellant did not strike it. It is 
further undisputed that defendant Jose Gonzales, after realizin\ 
that his vision was obstructed, turned left in front of the 
appellant (Gonzales depo., p.10, 18 and 21) and then collided 
with the appellant. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the 
collision between appellant and Gonzales was the actual cause ol 
Jensen's injury. Finally, it is undisputed that plaintiff has I 
recollection of the accident. (Jensen Depo. p. 6-19). 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONDUCT OF MOUNTAIN BELL WAS NOT THE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURIES SUSTAINED 
BY APPELLANT. 
To place this case in proper perspective, and to render 
irrelevant the significant portion of appellant's brief 
devoted to the issue of Mountain Bell's negligence, we will 
concede, arguendo, for purposes of this appeal only, that the 
alleged negligence of Mountain Bell was not determinable by 
way of summary judgment. The same concession was made at the 
trial level for purposes of focusing on the key issue--proximate 
causation. 
Thus narrowed, the case once again presents to this court 
the interesting, and oft-misunderstood policy question of the 
extent to which the negligence of a passive actor will result in 
the imposition of legal responsibility in the case of subse-
quent acts of negligence by the plaintiff or third parties. 
A. The Issue is One of Law Not One for 
Jury Determination 
Appellant's argument that these issues should be presented 
to a jury for determination perpetuates a common misunder-
standing of what has come to be called the l~w of "proximate 
causation." Although scholars and courts differ as to how 
these concepts should be articulated, most authorities now 
seem So agree that in its classical application "proximate 
-5-
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causation" is not a factual determination but is a determina-
tion consisting of legal policy which determines, given a set 
of facts, the extent to which an actor's negligence exposes him 
to liability. A jury instruction committee comprised of judges 
and lawyers of the State of Utah articulated its agreement with 
this proposition in its report as follows: 
Note that the term "proximate cause" is not 
used or defined in the instruction. "Proxi-
mate cause," as distinguished from simple 
cause and effect, classically involves the 
question as to whether the plaintiff is in a 
class of persons protected from the risk of 
harm which occurred to him, or whether the 
harm occurred to him is a harm which he is 
protected against. The committee believes 
that in the vast majority of negligence cases, 
there will be no genuine issue as to "proxi-
mate cause," but only as to simple cause and 
effect. The committee is further of the 
opinion that "eroximate cause" issues when 
they occur ordinarilr are and should be 2 
ruled ueon by the trial court as matters of law. 
[Emphasis added]. 
A member of that committee, Professor E. Wayne Thode, has 
written an excellent and extensive analysis of this question. 3 
Professor Thode, in advocating a "duty-risk" approach to the 
question as opposed to the "proximate causation" approach 
states: 
Under the duty-risk method of analysis the 
determination of the scope of the legal 
system's protection is entirely a court 
2This jury instruction report, approved by this court on July 
28, 1976 has subsequently received the partial imprimatur of" 
this court in Batty v. Mitchell, 575 p. 2d 1040 I 1044 (Utah 19!8 
3Thode, "Tort Analysis: Duty Risk vs. Proximate Cause and the 
Rational Allocation of Functions between Judge and Jury," 1977 
Utah L . Rev. 1. 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
function--the jury plays no part-in this as-
pect of the case. The issue for the court 
is whether the risk to which the plaintiff 
has been subjected is within the scope of the 
defendant's duty. If the answer is in the 
affirmative, the court is then obligated as 
part of its duty function to set the standard 
with which the defendant must have complied to 
avoid liability. The jury has the burden4of determining if the standard was breached. 
This court, although typically reluctant to grant summary 
relief in negligence cases or reverse jury determinations, 
has adopted the judge/jury allocation of function in this area 
by ruling as a matter of law on "proximate cause" issues 
frequently. In Toma v. Utah Power & Light Company, 12 Utah 2d 
275, 365 P.2d 788 (1961), the court affirmed a ruling by the 
district court judge on a motion for directed verdict. This 
court there discussed the very issue which we now raise--that 
of judge/jury allocation: 
Strenuous efforts have been repeatedly made 
to have us reverse or at least modify the 
Hillyard case, particularly as it has to do 
with the determination of when proximate cause 
becomes a jury question. It has been vigor-
ously argued that this case imposes a severe 
and unreasonable burden upon the plaintiff, 
and works a grave injustice upon an innocent 
injured person. The injured person is often 
stopped from holding responsible one joint 
tort feasor while prevailing against the other. 
Regardless of these many efforts we have con-
sistently upheld our decision in the Hillyard 
case. (12 Utah 2d at 287). 
In Anderson vs. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Company, 24 Utah 2d 
128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970), this court affirmed a ruling as a 
4 Id. at 26. 
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matter of law by the trial court on proximate causation 
on a motion for directed verdict. See also Velasquez 
v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989 
(1961) wherein an n.o.v. on a proximate cause issue was 
affirmed by the court. 
We conclude that a determination, as a matter of 
law, of the extent to which Mountain Bell's conduct in 
the instant case imposes legal responsibility is entirely 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
B. Mountain Bell, Under Utah Law, is Not 
Legally Responsible For the InJuries 
Incurred by Plaintiff. 
To set the stage for an analysis of the legal respon-
sibility of Mountain Bell under the circumstances of the 
instant case, it must be recognized that there were three 
basic actors involved--Mountain Bell, Jensen, and Gonzales. 
As to Mountain Bell, its conduct, at worst, was that of 
a stage hand in arranging the props around which the subsequent 
collision would occur. Simply stated, at 8: 00 a. m. on Septem-
ber 8, 1977 (some six hours before the accident) Mountain Bell 
parked its repair truck at the intersection in question, 
placed warning cones in all four directions, and in the 
north/south directions placed "Men Working" signs behind and 
ahead of the truck. The truck had its four-way flashers on, 
its headlights on and two strobe lights flashing. At the time 
of the accident, several hours later, the sole Mountain Bell 
employee in the area was in a manhole in the intersection and, 
therefore, did not witness the accident. 
-8-
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t 
The next actor, in chronological sequence, was Gonzales. 
He approached the intersection from the north with the inten-
tion of turning left to the east. Whatever else may be clear 
or unclear about Gonzales' testimony, it is certain that he 
saw the Mountain Bell truck, that he recognized it obstructed 
his vision of oncoming traffic from the south, and that he 
sat and pondered the situation for two minutes prior to the 
time that he commenced his left turn into the intersection. 
The turn was almost immediately followed by the collision 
with plaintiff on this motorcycle--Gonzales having estimated 
plaintiff's speed at approximately 60 miles per hour. 5 
Counsel for the plaintiff, in examining Gonzales by 
leading questions, made it perfectly clear that Gonzales saw 
and appreciated the dangerous character of the situation: 
QUESTION: [by Mr. Dibblee] It was kind of 
dangerous, the fact that you couldn't 
see everything; isn't that right? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
[Gonzales deposition at p.33] 
5see for example the Gonzales testimony at page 10 of his 
deposition wherein when asked what he did after he arrived 
at the intersection and stopped, he said "I wait there. I 
couldn't see, you know, in front of me. There was a utility 
truck working there. I couldn't see nothing." With respect 
to the time that Gonzales had to absorb and digest the 
situation, he testified that he waited in the left turn lane 
for "about a couple of minutes." (Gonzales depo. at p.18]. 
-9-
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The final actor, the plaintiff Jensen, suffers from 
complete amnesia of the accident and immediately preceding 
events. In the absence of any testimony from Jensen, or any 
other evidence suggesting that he did not see and appreciate 
the conditions of the intersection as he approached it, Jensen 
is subject to the applicable legal presumptions under the 
circumstances--specifically, he is charged with the knowledge 
of those things which he either saw or which, in the exercise 
of reasonable care, he could not help but have seen. See, 
~' Nymen v. Cedar City, 12 Utah 45, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961). 
Against this straightforward and relatively simple factual 
background, we now consider the applicable law as previously 
articulated by this court. The seminal decision was Hillyard 
v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953). 
It will be recalled that in Hillyard the static negligence was 
that of parking a truck so that its rear end obstructed the 
traveled portion of the highway. Subsequently, driver Vaughn 
Aston and passenger Robert Reif, plaintiffs deceased, collided 
with the rear end of the truck with Aston claiming he had not 
seen the truck, because of other traffic, until immediately 
before the collision. In a lengthy discussion as to whether 
the negligence of Aston was an intervening cause, hence exculpa-1 
ting the staticly negligent defendant, this court drew the 
following critical distinction: 
-10-
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In applying the test of foreseeability to 
situations where a negligently created pre-
existing condition combines with a later act 
of negligence causing an injury, the courts 
have drawn a clear-cut distinction between 
two classes of cases. The first situation 
is where one has negligently created a 
dangerous condition [such as parking the 
truck] and a later actor observed, or cir-
cumstances are such that he could not fail 
to observe, but negligently failed to avoid 
it. The second situation involves conduct 
of a later intervening actor who negligently 
failed to observe the dangerous condition 
until it is too late to avoid it. In regard 
to the first situation it is held as a 
matter of law that the later intervening act 
does interrupt the natural sequence of 
events and cut off the legal effect of the 
negligence of the initial actor. This is 
based upon the reasoning that it is not 
reasonably to be foreseen nor expected that 
one who actually becomes cognizant of a 
dangerous condition in ample time to avert 
injury will fail to do so. On the other 
hand, with respect to the second situation, 
where the second actor fails to see the 
danger in time to avoid it, it is held that 
a jury question exists, based on the 
rationale that it can reasonably be antici-
pated that circumstances may arise wherein 
others may not observe the dangerous con-
dition until too late to escape it. The 
distinction is basically one between a 
situation in which the second actor has 
sufficient time, after being charged with 
knowledge of the hazard, to avoid it, and 
one in which the second actor negligently 
becomes confronted with an emergency 
situation. 1 Utah 2d at 151 (emphasis in 
original). 
In Hillyard, of course, because of the immediacy of Aston's 
discovery of the truck, the matter was considered to be a 
proper question for the jury. However, this court made it 
eminently clear that when the subsequent actor (in this case, 
either Gonzales, or Jensen or both) actually becomes cognizant 
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of the dangerous condition in ample time to avert it, his 
conduct becomes "intervening" in the legal sense and 
exculpates the static tortfeasor. It should be noted that 
in the instant case Mountain Bell's conduct is legally even 
more remote from the accident than in most of these static 
condition proximate cause cases. Its remoteness is accentua-
ted by the fact that we have the intervening conduct of not 
one but two subsequent actors--Jensen and Gonzales. Gonzales 
clearly apprehended the dangerous situation, digested it, 
and proceeded notwithstanding it--precisely that conduct 
described by this court in Hillyard as being sufficient to 
"cut off" prior static negligence. Jensen, likewise, accordir 
to the undisputed evidence, must be charged with having 
seen the condition and yet proceeded unsafely into the inter· 
section. 
Hillyard has several progeny which have consistently up· 
held the basic Hillyard analysis. The decision which is 
factually most analogous to the instant case is Velasquez 
v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989 
(1961). In that case, a truck was parked to the side of the 
road protruding into the driven portion of the road. An 
oncoming bus (in which plaintiff was a passenger) approached 
the truck and the driver conceded that he saw the truck well 
in advance of the ultimate collision. However, he had some 
sort of mental blackout for a few moments and thereby was 
unable to avoid colliding with the truck when he finally 
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became conscious again. This court sustained that trial 
court's finding that the conduct of the bus driver was not 
"legally foreseeable" by the static tortfeasor and, therefore, 
that the latter's negligence was not the proximate cause of 
the injury. The following statement of conclusion of that 
case is indicative of its similarity to the instant matter: 
Applying the foregoing test to our situation: 
we think it is not reasonably to be foreseen 
that an oncoming driver (Greyhound) would see 
(or fail to see) this large, well-lighted 
truck so parked upon the highway, and with at 
least one and one-half usable traffic lanes 
to his left nevertheless run into it. The 
trial court was correct in concluding and 
entered judgment in favor of Interstate Motor 
Lines as a matter of law on the ground that 
the negligence of Greyhound was the sole proxi-
mate cause of the collision. (Utah 12 2d 
at 383). 
The recent case of Watters v. Querry, 588 P.2d 702 
(Utah 1978) which appellant relies upon heavily in his brief, 
further supports the emergency/non-emergency distinction 
enunciated in Hillyard and Velasquez. In Watters, this court 
rejected the following jury instruction as incorrect when 
applied to the fact situation present in that case: 
If a driver creates a dangerous condition with 
a motor vehicle, but this condition is such 
that another driver, exercising reasonable 
care, should have observed and avoided a 
dangerous condition, then the negligence of 
the later driver is an independent intervening 
cause and, therefore the first driver cannot 
be the proximate cause of the collision. 
-13-
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But, in rejecting the instruction, this court was quick to 
point out that the instruction was not necessarily incorrect 
as a general statement of the law if applied in appropriate 
circumstances, citing Hillyard. The clear import of the 
citation to Hillyard was that the emergency/non-emergency 
distinction was affirmed by this court. While the above 
instruction was not appropriate in an emergency situation 
such as existed in Watters, it is still an accurate statement 
of the law as to non-emergency situations, such as here 
where there is an intervening act of negligence that "cuts 
off" the static negligence of Mountain Bell. Unlike Watters 
Mountain Bell did not slam on its brakes to create an emer-
gency situation for which it can be held liable. Unlike 
Hillyard, defendant Gonzales and the appellant were not 
weaving in and out of traffic so that they were suddenly 
confronted with the parked Mountain Bell truck after which 
they could not avoid it. Both Jensen and Gonzales knew or 
should have known that the truck was there. There was 
nothing obstructing their view, nothing to prevent them from 
taking appropriate precautions. In short, there was no 
emergency situation and therefore, Gonzales' independent 
intervening act, rather than Mountain Bell's=parking of the 
truck, was the sole proximate cause of appellant's injury. 
Numerous decisions in other jurisdictions have consis-
tently held in similar situations that the later act of an 
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intervening tortfeasor, and not the parking of the vehicle, 
is the proximate cause of the resulting injury. 
For example, in Shephard v. Azzarelli Construction Co., 
294 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1974), the appellate court upheld a 
summary judgment entered against a plaintiff in a fact 
situation similar to the case at bar. The plaintiff was 
injured when, while attempting to make a left-hand turn on a 
green light on a busy street, her vehicle was struck by a 
car proceeding in a direct course from the opposite direction. 
In that action, she sued not the driver of the vehicle that 
hit her, but rather the construction company, the owner of 
the two trucks, one of which was broken down and both of 
which were stopped, unmoving, in the left turn lane, opposite 
and across the intersection from her. Plaintiff contended 
that these vehicles blocked her vision of the intersection 
and specifically the car into which she turned and with 
which she collided. The Florida court, with a comparative 
negligence statute similar to Utah's, affirmed the summary 
judgment on the ground that: 
The arguably negligent act of permitting a 
truck to fall into disrepair [and negligently 
being in the intersection obstructing her 
vision,] had nothing whatever, 'proximate' 
or otherwise to do with the occurrence of 
the accident, which would have occurred in 
precisely the same way had the trucks merely 
been stopped waiting to make a left turn 
from their proper location in the inter-
section. 
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In Sims v. Apperson Chemicals, Inc., 185 So.2d 179 
(Fla. 1966) the plaintiff brought action for injuries sus-
tained by his children in a collision with the defendant's 
automobile. The plaintiff joined the chemical company which 
placed the vehicle in the roadway at night in violation of 
municipal ordinances as a defendant for creating the con-
dition. The trial court held that even if defendant's truck 
had been parked on the paved road at night by defendant's 
employee in violation of the ordinance, the truck was an 
immobile instrumentality that presented a patent situation 
and was not an operating, efficient or proximate cause of 
the plaintiff's injuries. 
The Florida appellate court affirmed the decision 
citing numerous cases from jurisdictions such as New Jersey, 
North Carolina and Louisiana and held: 
In the case at bar it was unimportant whether 
the defendant's car rested legally or illeg-
ally upon the street, since its obstruction 
to the vision of the crossing pedestrian, or 
to the driver of a moving car upon the road-
way, would, under the testimony, be equally 
effective. In either event its impotence for 
harm or damage, as an innocuous, immobile 
instrumentality must be manifest, since in 
both situations it simply presented a patent 
condition, and not an operating, efficient or 
proximate cause, which can be said to contain 
by its activity, that potentiality for harm 
or damage, which furnishes the test upon 
which the rule of liability in this character 
of tort-feasance is predicated. at 182. 
Walker v. Illinois Commercial Telephone Co., 43 N.E. 2d 
412 (Ill. 1942) is the seminal case in the area. The Walker 
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case involved the parking of a telephone company truck with a 
pull trailer so as to obstruct the vision of drivers approaching 
an intersection. A collision occurred and Walker sued the 
other driver and the phone company and obtained a judgment 
against both. The court in that case held that although the 
initial act of negligence may be the occasion for an inter-
vening cause which intervenes and produces the injury, the 
intervening cause will be held to be the proximate cause of the 
injury unless the intervening act is within the control of the 
party responsible for the responsible act. The court dismissed 
the action against the phone company holding: 
. . . that the truck being there, at that 
particular time, did nothing more than 
furnish a condition by which the injury to 
the plaintiff was made possible. The proxi-
mate cause of the injuries and damages 
complained of, was the contributing negli-
gence of plaintiffs and the negligence of the 
defendant Norriss. (at 416) 
Further, the court found that the intervening act was not within 
the control of the phone company. 
In Fultz v. Myers, 282 N.E. 2d 488 (Ill. 1971) with a 
similar fact situation, the Illinois Appellate Court reiterated 
the holding in Walker that an obstruction only furnished a 
condition for the later intervening negligence of others and 
held that: 
As to the cross-appeal of the Plaintiff against 
Defendant Folks, [a co-defendant who had placed a 
vehicle in the intersection but who did not collide 
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with either the plaintiff or defendant] the question 
becomes one of whether there was an intervening 1 
cause or in other terms whether the parking of the ' 
Folks automobile was the proximate cause of the 
accident here in question. It is to be noted that 
if the act complained of does nothin~ more than 
create a condition that makes the in]ury possible 
by some subsequent independent act of a third 
person, the creation of the condition is not the 
proximate cause of the in]ury. at 490 (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Its position upon the street was obvious to all 
persons and a condition necessary to be reckoned 
with by the traveling public. Under the above 
rule, we are not of the opinion that it can be 
considered an operating, efficient or proximate 
cause of appellant's injuries. (at 491) 
As has been consistently held by the above-cited cases ~ 
supported by the Utah decisions in Hillyard; Velasquez; Toma:j 
Anderson, respondent Mountain Bell's negligent act was not the 
proximate cause of appellant's injury; that act was cut off~ 
later intervening acts of Jensen and Gonzales which became th< 
proximate cause of appellant's injury. I 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing legal authorities and the facts 
of this case, it is clear that Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Company was not and is not the proximate cause of 
I 
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appellant's injuries. This court should affirm the judgment 
of the lower court. 
DATED this ~day of ~ , 1979. 
~---f RO~T~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to James R. Soper and Richard C. Dibbl, 
400 Ten Broadway Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this~ day of 
tl~, 1979. 
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